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ENFORCING AMERICAN PRIVATE ANTITRUST
DECISIONS IN JAPAN: IS COMITY REAL?
Michael Peter Waxman*
Introduction
The explosion of international business over the past twenty years
has created a crisis in the transnational enforcement of law. This
has been particularly true in the area of competition law. Despite
efforts to allow contractual parties to select fora for the resolution of
antitrust disputes,' the absence of international or bi-lateral legal
standards for competition law 2 has forced parties to wrestle with the
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Of Counsel, Godfrey &
Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The author acknowledges his deep gratitude for the invaluable assistance of the following people and institutions: Professors Akira Negishi, Yoshio Ohara
and Shunichiro Nakano (Kobe University, Faculty of Law) and Satoshi Watanabe and Yoshiaki
Nomura (Osaka University, Faculty of Law); and his research assistants, Michelle Hasenstab and
Jane Robinson. He is also indebted to the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars and
the Japan - U.S. Educational Commission for the 1993-94 Senior Fulbright Grant that permitted
him to teach at Kobe and Osaka Universities while doing this research.
N.B. In order to assure as complete an understanding by American attorneys as is possible, the
author has chosen intentionally to provide English language authorities (sometimes unofficial
translations) and to use the American method of stating a person's name (i.e. family name last).
The reader must consider the risks created by this editorial decision and adjust her/his analyses
accordingly. See Dan Fenno Henderson, The Japanese Law in English: Some Thoughts on Scope
and Method, 16 VANDERBILT J. OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 601 (1983).
1. See generally The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No.
6997 (enacted by the United States, September 1, 1970) (providing guidelines for the recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards). See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 623 (1985) (deciding a claim brought under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards). But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §488, Reporters' Note, Note 1 (1986) (noting that "[t]he law
of most states regards certain kinds of issues as not subject to arbitration, typically agreements not
of a commercial character or not between merchants, and public law issues such as antitrust").
2. There have been significant efforts to transcend national differences. See, e.g., Draft International Antitrust Code as a G.A.T.T. - M.T.O. - Plurilateral Trade Agreement (published and
released, July 10, 1993 Munich, Germany), 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, at
S-I (Aug. 19, 1993) (Spec. Supp.) (proposing an international Code in antitrust law); see also
Carl A. Cira Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 247, 260 (1982) (discussing the significance of foreign blocking laws to future American antitrust enforcement); Joseph P. Griffin, EC/US Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: Impact
on Transnational Business, 24 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1051, 1051 (1993) (stating that
"there is no international law of antitrust"); Introduction and Recommendations of ABA Anti-
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conflicts created by the diversity of domestic business/legal cultures
and the importance to each sovereign of its own competition law. 3
Naturally, the dearth of international law standards has fostered a
search for common ground on competition law issues that requires a
greater emphasis on comity." However, despite the constant bleating
trust Law Section's Special Committee on International Antitrust, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 161 (1991) (providing various recommendations in order to deter cartel behavior and
other international antitrust problems).
3. See Erika Nijenhuis, Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce: Suggestions
for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (1987) (stating that the fundamental
objection to the enforcement of American antitrust laws abroad is that such laws infringe on
foreign sovereignty). But cf Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, reprinted in, 30 I.L.M. 1491, 1492 (1991) [hereinafter U.S./European Agreement]
(purporting to "promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between the Parties [the U.S. and the Commission of the European Communities] in the
application of their competition laws."). Despite a finding by the European Court of Justice that
the Commission did not have the authority to enter this Agreement, the Council approved the
Agreement in early 1995. See European Parliament Endorses Accord on Cooperation Between
Commission and U.S., 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 107 (Jan. 26, 1995) (reporting
that the European Parliament voted to endorse the antitrust agreement between the European
Union and the U.S. on Jan. 20, 1995); John 0. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust
Enforcement: Do Differences Matter?, 4 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POL'Y J. 303, 305-06 (1995) [hereinafter Haley, Enforcement] (inquiring whether national differences in Japanese and American
law enforcement of competition rules make a difference to international trade); see also Cira,
supra note 2, at 261 (explaining that the realities of international trade make a strict territorial
approach to competition law jurisdiction anachronistic).
4. The importance of harmonizing competition policies of the United States and its trading
partners is reflected in a report prepared by the Special Task Force on Competition Policy of the
antitrust law section of the ABA, printed in a Special Supplement found at 64 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1604, at S-4 (Mar. 4, 1993). See U.S./European Agreement, supra note 3,
at 1491 (noting that "the sound and effective enforcement of the Parties' competition laws would
be enhanced by cooperation"); see also International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of
1994 ("IAEAA"), 15 U.S.C.A. §6201 (West. Supp. 1995) (noting "the Attorney General of the
United States and the Federal Trade Commission may provide . . . antitrust evidence to assist the
foreign antitrust authority" on a reciprocal basis); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State of Cal., 1993
Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,280 ( U.S. June 29, 1993) (Souter, J. majority) (discussing the role of
international comity in the enforcement of antitrust laws); id. at 70,420 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(refuting that claims against petitioners constituted an inappropriate extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629 (noting that international comity
concerns outweigh the public policy interests associated with antitrust claims in a purely domestic
setting); Yoichiro Hamabe, Changing Antimonopoly Policy in the Japanese Legal System - An
International Perspective, 28 INT'L. LAW. 903, 920 n.1 13 & 926 (lending strong support for foreign countries to push for enforcement of antitrust law in Japan). Japan has clear precedent for
transnational antitrust cooperation. See Yasuhiro Fujita, Japanese Regulation of Foreign Transactions and Private Law Consequences, 18 N.Y. L. FORUM 317, 329-30 (1972) [hereinafter
Fujita, Japanese Regulation] (discussing a rule invoked to provide a remedy to a foreign buyer
where a Japanese seller sold goods in violation of dumping regulations); Mitsuo Matsushita, The
Antimonopoly Law of Japan, 11 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 57, 68 (1978) (noting the In re
Toyobo case, in which two governments cooperated in an effort to control restrictive international
business practices). Of particular interest are the comity concerns for the enforcement of U.S.
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by American courts, lawyers and legal scholars about the need to
respect international comity, serious questions remain whether the
international respect for comity in the recognition and enforcement
of foreign decisions is real.
Unfortunately, the growing need for transnational enforcement of
antitrust law has spawned legal and political solutions that tend to
reinforce the self-protective concerns of sovereigns rather than provide effective solutions. This is especially true for the United States
and Japan.5 The United States has used a mixture of legal armstretching' and political/economic coercion 7 to address what apantitrust judgment damages in foreign countries. See George G. Garvey, Report of Consultant to
House Judiciary Committee On His Study of the Treble Damage Remedy, 46 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1154, at 356 (Mar. 1, 1984) [hereinafter "Report of Consultant"]
(criticising treble damage actions brought in the international arena). For comity as the basis for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, see chapter 5, titled Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 368, 384 in ADREAs F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION (1993).
5. See Richard L. Thurston, Japan - The Antimonopoly Act and Japanese Fair Trade Commission Enforcement, 27 INT'L LAW. 533, 533-34 (1993) (discussing the background for the U.S.
and Japan's recent economic relationship); Alex Y. Seita & Jiro Tamura, The Historical Background of Japan's Antimonopoly Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 119-25 (explaining the antimonopoly law and the frictions between the U.S. and Japan); see also U.S. Negotiators Confront Japan on Deregulation, Antitrust Issues, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No.
1690, at 623 (Nov. 24, 1994) [hereinafter "U.S. Negotiators"] (discussing Japan's government
deregulation and the reinforcement of its antitrust policies); Economic Friction Between U.S.,
Japan Could Reach Crisis Stage, Expert Says, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 29, at 1077-78,
(July 17, 1991) (reporting that a leading American scholar called for "more protectionism" because "current strategic and economic relationships are working to the benefit of Japan at the
expense of the United States."); Haley, Enforcement, supra note 3, at 307 (noting that public
perceptions in the U.S. and Japan that their respective enforcement practices have anticompetitive
effects and tend to foster the imposition of protectionist trade restaints in both states); Japan, U.S.
Split Over New U.S. Antitrust Policy, Japan Econ. Newswire, Kyodo News Serv. (Apr. 14, 1992)
(reporting that a senior Japanese government official attacked a new U.S. policy to broaden the
reach of the U.S. antitrust enforcement overseas). But cf. Hoken S. Seki, Effective Dispute Resolution in U.S. - Japan Commercial Transactions, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 979, 981-85 (1984)
(noting the informal arrangement between the U.S. and Japan for the exchange of nonconfidential
information and experiences in antitrust developments between the two countries. Although this
exchange takes place at annual meetings, there is no written agreement or document reflecting the
arrangement); see also International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 6201 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing the Attorney General and the FTC to assist foreign antitrust authorities on a reciprocal basis); Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Developments in Japanese
Competition Law: Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Resulting From The Structural
Impediments Initiative, 60 ANTITRUST L. J.279, 286 (1991) (describing the Guidelines promulgated in 1991 for the purpose of explaining Japan's Fair Trade Commission's "JFTC" interpretations and enforcement policy of the Antimonopoly Act).
6. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1993 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 70,408-70,416; Hamabe, supra note
4, at 918 ("[T]he JFTC and many Japanese commentators deny the extraterritory effect of the
Antimonopoly Act.").
[i]n
this regard, a study group set up by the Fair Trade Commission reported in 1990
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pears to be the incongruity of Japan's broad competition law8 and
its puny application of that law." Despite regular statements to the
that the Anti-Monopoly Law should be applicable to foreign companies residing
outside Japan, if they act against the Law. However, the report added that there may
be cases where Japan should refrain from applying its law out of various
considerations.
HIROsHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 345 (1992).
7. See Jonathan D. Richards, Japan Fair Trade Commission Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices: An Illustration of Why Antitrust Law Is a Weak Solution
To U.S. Trade Problems With Japan, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 921, 930 (discussing motives for seeking
stronger Japanese antitrust enforcement to help U.S. companies); Saita & Tamura, supra note 5,
at 144-45 (discussing how the American government attempted to establish an economic democracy in Japan during its occupation of Japan after World War II, yet never meant to "create an
economically prosperous Japan"); see also Haley, Enforcement supra note 3, at 303-04 (noting
that the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) negotiations aimed to strengthen the enforcement
of Japanese anitmonopoly rules); Hiroshi lyori, A Comparison of U.S.-Japan Antitrust Law:
Looking At The International Harmonization of Competition Law, 4 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POL'Y
J. 59 (1995) (tracing the economic and political developments between Japan and the United
States leading to a stronger Japanese antimonopoly law); Mitsuo Matsushita, Japanese AntiTrust Law in the Context of Trade Issues, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 15, 16 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994) (explaining how the U.S. government chose a
"'soft' approach" to the anticompetitiveness of Japan, instead of formally investigating); Mark K.
Morita, Comment, Structural Impediments Initiative: Is It An Effective Correction of Japan's
Antimonopoly Policy?, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 777, 778-86 (1991) (discussing the motivation
behind the promulgation of the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)); U.S. Negotiators, supra
note 5, at 623 (explaining negotiations between U.S. and Japan concerning antitrust issues); Japan Urged To Loosen Keiretsu Ties, Beef Up Antitrust, Japan Econ. Newswire, Kyodo News
Serv. (May 22, 1991) (discussing United States' warnings to Japan to enforce its antitrust laws
more strongly); Japan, U.S. Split Over New U.S. Antitrust Policy, supra note 5, at 1-2 (discussing a 1992 U.S. policy which broadened the reach of U.S. antitrust enforcement overseas); U.S.
Says Japan's Planned Antitrust Fine Hike Too Low, Japan Econ. Newswire, Kyodo News Serv.
(Mar. 14, 1992) (explaining the dissatisfaction of the United States with Japan's penalties for
antitrust violations because they were too low); see, e.g., Japan's High Land Costs, Policies Deter
U.S. Investment, Exports, GOP Report Says, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15 at 633 (Apr. 14,
1993) (reporting that a report released by the House Wednesday Group, made up of Republican
House members, recommended a "new trade initiative with the goal of prodding Japan to abandon its cost protectionist policies").
8. Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade
translated in EHS VOL.11 KA-KJ. [hereinafter AMA]. This law is commonly called the Antimonopoly Act, or the AMA.
9. See Haley, Enforcement. supra note 3, at 304 n.5 (noting that commentary on the enforcement of the AMA outside of Japan, has been nearly all critical); John 0. Haley, Antitrust and
Foreign Enterprise in Japan, 2 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 3-4 (July 15, 1980) (discussing the Japanese
FTC and its problems of enforcing Japan's antitrust laws); Richards, supra note 7, at 935-41
(discussing antitrust measures that the United States wanted and the Japanese promised to implement); James F. Rill, Competition Policy: A Force For Open Markets, 61 ANTITRUST L. J. 637,
637 (1993) (stating there is a widespread beleif that there is lax enforcement of Japan's antimonopoly act and analyzing the success of current "market-opening" initiatives, such as the SII talks);
see also Morita, supra note 7, at 786-99 (discussing the history of Japan's antimonopoly policy);
Kenji Sanekata, Antitrust in Japan: Recent Trends and Their Socio-political Background, 20
U.B.C. L. REV. 379, 381-866 (1986) (discussing Japan's patterns of enforcement of its antimonopoly statute); JFTCs Annual Report Outlines Enforcement Agenda, 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
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contrary by the Japanese government,'" it is highly unlikely that Japan will increase significantly either its public enforcement of competition law" (much less expand its virtually non-existent private
enforcement)' or recognize and enforce foreign decisions based on
Rep. (BNA) 713 (Dec. 15, 1994) [hereinafter JFTC's Annual Report] (providing data and statistics on the activities of the Japan Fair Trade Commission); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing support for the political/economic coercion the U.S. has used to encourage
effective enforcement of Japanese antimonopoly laws). But see Takeo Kosugi, Recent Developments in the Enforcement of the antimonopoly Law in Japan, Int'l Bar Ass'n., 25th Biennial

Conferences (Nov. 1994) at 6 (arguing that despite the Tokyo High Court's decision in the
Shiseido case, a continuing and gradual trend will be stricter enforcement of the AMA by the
JFTC and the Japanese courts).
10. See Seita & Tamura, supra note 5, at 115-25 (discussing how Japan says it will publicly
enforce its competition law); Fair Trade Commission Issues Rules on Enforcement of Japan's

Antimonopoly Law, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (July 17, 1991) (explaining that the JFTC
has been drawing up new guidelines in response to criticism from the U.S. on its enforcement of
its antimonopoly law); Haley, Enforcement supra note 3, at 308-14 (discussing the enforcement
regimes of Japan as compared to the U.S., and explaining Japan's trend toward stricter enforcement of antimonopoly rules); Lipsky, supra note 5, at 285-87 (discussing the Japanese response to
date of the draft guidelines of the Structural Impediments Initiative); Morita, supra note 7, at
787-91 (discussing the Japanese governmental structure and response to business cartels); Hiroshi
Oda, Introduction in

JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION,

supra

note 7, at 1, 8 (stating that Japan accepts the idea that business cartels can be potentially anitcompetitive); U.S. Negotiators, supra note 5, at 623 (noting that Japanese negotiators viewed
U.S. demands to prepare annual deregulation reports as "numerical targets, which Japan adamantly refuses to accept."); see also, Kosugi, supra note 9, at 1-6 (illustrating the U.S.'s pressure
on and Japan's compliance with stricter enforcement of various aspects of the AMA); see, e.g..
Japanese Agency Urges Associations to Open Doors to Foreign Competitors, 10 Int'l Trade Rep.

(BNA) No. 11, at 462 (Mar. 17, 1993) (stating that the JFTC will take "appropriate action" to
pry open certain industries to foreign companies); Japan's discounts safeguarded, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1993, at 6 (describing an order from the JFTC requiring electronic companies to allow
retailers to discount their products without fear of losing supply contracts).
11. See JFTCs Annual Report, supra note 9, at 713 (providing data on JFTC cases for previous years that are below U.S. expectations for tougher enforcement); Harry First, Japan's Antitrust Policy: Impact on Import Competition, in

FRAGILE INTERDEPENDENCE

63, 69-70 (T. Pugel

ed., 1986) (explaining less than vigorous activities by the JFTC in enforcing its Antimonopoly
Act); Lipsky, supra note 5, at 287 (expressing a number of key objections by commentators on
Japan's guidelines for business cartels); see also, John 0. Haley, Japanese Antitrust Enforcement:
Implications For United States Trade, 18 N. KEN. L. REV. 335, 335 (1991) [hereinafter Haley,
Implications] (listing shortcomings of Japanese antitrust enforcement e.g., lack of staff, restricted
investigatory power, and weak sanctions); Haley, Enforcement, supra note 3, at 311 (discussing
the limited role the Japanese judiciary plays in enforcing antimonopoly laws). But see Richards,
supra note 7, at 936 (discussing various recent improvements in Japanese antitrust enforcement);
Rill, supra note 9, at 640 (discussing how much Japan's FTC enforcement activity has expanded).
Cf. Thurston, supra note 5, at 537 (giving reasons on why the policy of the JFTC will succeed or
not). See generally, J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and InstitutionalBarriers to Litigation in Japan,94 YALE L. J. 604, 616 (1985) (discussing

the framework for antitrust enforcement in Japan); Sanekata, supra note 9, at 381 (describing the
JFTC's patterns of enforcing the antimonopoly laws).
12. See First, supra note 11, at 65 (noting that a private right of action exists under the Antimonopoly Act, yet it "is contingent on there being at least an initial decision by the FTC that
the act has been violated"); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 617 (stating that "private antitrust
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the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts.13 However, the appropriate forum and law for the resolution of antitrust
disputes between American or other parties and Japanese parties is
often the law and courts of the United States. 4 Therefore, it is important that a plaintiff be prepared for the possibility that if the
defendant does not have sufficient assets in the United States to
compensate a victorious plaintiff for the damages awarded, it may
be necessary for the plaintiff to obtain recognition and enforcement
of the U.S. decision in Japan.' 5 Indeed, both the Japanese and
American governments may be significantly relieved to find a cooperative middle ground that permits recognition and enforcement in
Japan of American antitrust decisions without the rancor raised by
U.S. demands for greater Japanese enforcement of Japan's own
laws or by the U.S. of its extraterritorial jurisdiction. Surprisingly,
despite successful recognition and enforcement in Japan of U.S.
cases in various areas of the law,' 6 this avenue of redress has never
been tried in the area of antitrust. This method of decision, recognition and enforcement would allow successful plaintiffs in the U.S. to
obtain redress through the Japanese courts while meeting the need
of the Japanese courts to ensure security and respect for the Japanese legal system and Japan's law and public policy. Notwithstanding the absence of conventions or treaties between Japan and the
U.S. that directly address the recognition and enforcement of forenforcement has been almost nonexistent"); Rill, supra note 9, at 640-41 (noting that some measures have been adopted to increase the opportunities for obtaining private damage relief under
the AMA); Sanekata supra note 9, at 397 (discussing how ineffective the sanctions on businesses
were for violations of the antimonopoly laws); U.S. Negotiators supra note 5, at 623 (explaining
the U.S. demands for establishment of a mechanism for private sector participation in deregulation); see also Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, Product Liability in Japan: An Introduction to a Developing Area of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 29, 40 (1984) (explaining the
reasons for the small amount of private litigation in Japan).
13. See Hamabe, supra note 4, at 918 n.101 (explaining why antimonopoly issues in Japan
should be discussed under the Antimonopoly Act, not under U.S. antitrust laws).
14. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing why it is advantageous for plaintiffs to select the U.S. as the forum for potential disputes with Japanese companies). But see, infra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing problems those plaintiffs may encounter when
trying to get the decision recognized and enforced in Japan).
15. See Thomas S. Mackey, Litigation Involving Damages to U.S. Plaintiffs Caused by Private
Corporate Japanese Defendants, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 131, 172 (explaining what a plaintiff needs
to show in order to obtain recognition and enforement of a U.S. decision in Japan).
16. Takao Sawaki, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Japan, 23 INT'L
LAW. 29, 34-35 (1989) (discussing a well known case in Japan, the Kansai-Tekko case, where a
Japanese court refused to recognize and enforce a U.S. judgment against a Japanese company in a
personal injury suit); see infra notes 70 & 73 and accompanying text (discussing procedural issues
involved in conforming a U.S. case to meet Japanese standards).
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eign antitrust decisions obtained by traditional means, the likelihood
of successful recognition and enforcement of U.S. antitrust decisions
obtained through the exercise of traditional jurisdictional means
(i.e., non-extraterritorial) in Japan seems much stronger today than
ever. This Article introduces the significant difficulties a plaintiff
may encounter in attempting to obtain recognition and enforcement
of a U.S. antitrust decision in Japan and the recent developments in
Japan that may signal increasing opportunities for such recoveries.
I.

SELECTING THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM OR OTHER FORA

A plaintiff usually has the opportunity to file a claim before the
courts of the sovereign where the defendant or plaintiff is located or
sometimes may use an alternative dispute mechanism (e.g. international arbitration) in lieu of such fora. 1 7 A review of the application
of the competition and trade laws of Japan often will promptly discourage a plaintiff from selecting a Japanese forum and Japanese
law.' 8 Moreover, where the U.S. or Japanese plaintiff has the opportunity to elect the U.S. or Japanese legal system, 9 the appropriate
17. The selection of international arbitration should lead to effective enforcement of arbitral
decisions through the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, [the "New York Convention"], June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519, 330
U.N.T.S. 38,40 (entered into force in the United States, Dec. 29, 1970) ("Each Contracting State
shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles."). However, the potential for international arbitration enforcement in Japan is a
mixed bag. The Japanese experience with the recognition and enforcement of antitrust decrees is
unclear and decisions by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association have been asserted to
be highly suspect and at the minimum no different than using the Japanese courts. John Kakinuki,
Dispute Resolution in Japan: Choosing the Right Alternative, 9 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 6, 12-14
(Nov. 15, 1987).
18. See Hamabe, supra note 4, at 904-05, 910, 914 & 925-26 (explaining that the Japanese
judicial system has generally failed to protect consumers and other individuals' interests); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 631-34 (discussing general barriers to litigation in Japan); Richards,
supra note 7, at 956 (stating the Japanese government has done little to facilitate private party
actions under the Guidelines); Sanekata, supra note 9, at 396 (explaining why very few individuals choose to litigate civil actions in Japan); see also, Yasuhiro Fujita, Service of American Process Upon Japanese Nationals by Registered Mail and Enforceability of Resulting American
Judgments in Japan, 12 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 69, 70, 81 (1979) [hereinafter Fujita, Service] (listing the requirements for enforcing foreign judgments in Japan); Mackey, supra note 15,
at 172-77 (explaining the criteria provided for in Article 200 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure which is used to determine whether to enforce a foreign court's judgment in Japan). Compare the possibly inaccurate assumption in JFTC distribution guidelines that Japanese "distributors have less bargaining power than [foreign] manufacturers." See THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT GUIDELINES CONCERNING DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEMS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES (July 11, 1991); Hamabe, supra note 4, at 919-22.

19. See Mackey, supra note 15, at 137-40 (discussing choice of forum clauses and the Japanese
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forum and law to address a particular claim can be that of the
United States.2"
There are several good reasons for selecting the United States as
the forum and preferring its law over that of Japan. First, in Japan
the traditional procedures of the civil law system reduce significantly the opportunities for discovery,21 while enhancing the difficulty in proving conclusively the necessary degree of proximate causation between illegality and the harm to the plaintiff. Additionally,
the Japanese system reduces the liklihood for prompt resolution of
issues culminating in a judicial decision 2 and, for strong counsel
advocacy before the court.2 3 Next, Japanese competition law is
structured to remove the very incentives used in the United States to
attract private enforcement of claims addressing competition law issues - there are no treble damages and there are limited grounds
courts' reaction to them).
20. Id. at 140 (noting that a U.S. company should attempt to sign a choice of forum clause
with the Japanese company which specifies a U.S. court as the forum in the event of a dispute). It
might be better to bring such claims in the United States. Of course, where it is appropriate that a
Japanese forum and Japanese law be used, the plaintiff has no right to attempt to avoid that
system unless it is using a mutually acceptable forum such as may be agreed to in a contract
clause permitting the selection of arbitration. Id. at 139-40.
21. See ELLIOTT J. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 87 (1984) (stating that there is no discovery process in Japan, specifically, no interrogatories are sent and no
depositions are taken); Haley, Enforcement, supra note 3, at 312 (discussing Japan's evidentiary
problems particularly with respect to discovery); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 631 (explaining that
Japanese civil procedure provides few means of effective discovery either before or during trial);
see, e.g., CIVIL CODE [C.Civ.] art. 311-314 (Japan) translated in EHS Vol. II FA-FAA; see also
Mackey, supra note 15, at 149-60 (explaining extraterritorial discovery and the problems an attorney can face trying to discover evidence abroad); Sanekata, supra note 9, at 396-97 (explaining
that civil actions for damages have been much less effective because courts are prone to strictly
interpret the law and because it is extremely difficult to prove proximate causation between illegal
cartels and price levels); Yoshio Ohara, Judicial Assistance to be Afforded by Japan for Proceedings in the United States, U.S. 23 INT'L LAW. 10, 18-27 (1989) (discussing the taking of evidence
in Japan for proceedings in the United States); cf James H. Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery
and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the U.S.: Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 5,
9-17 (1979) (discussing methods for obtaining discovery and evidence abroad).
22. See ODA, JAPANESE LAW, supra note 6, at 88 (raising the question of whether there are
institutional barriers which make the Japanese reluctant to go to court); John 0. Haley, The
Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES 359, 381 (1978) (stating that proceedings that continue for eight to ten years are not uncommon); see also HAHN, supra note 21, at 8788 (discussing major differences in the litigation time frame in the United States and in Japan);

Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Commentary in

LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING

193-96 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963) (pointing out several reasons why the
elements of the American advisary system introduced in Japan did not function very well).
23. See, HAHN, supra note 21, at 12-19 (discussing how the high attorney's fees coupled with
the paucity of attorneys in Japan prevent many Japanese from consulting an attorney, even if a
dispute arises); Hamabe, supra note 4, at 904 (noting that there are few attorneys in Japan and
that "private parties and companies rarely exercise their rights in court by using attorneys").
SOCIETY
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upon which to base a claim. 4
However, the selection of U.S. courts and law can be fraught with
problems that are different but no less intimidating for plaintiffs.
The structuring of a U.S. case and decision for potential recognition
and enforcement in Japan may cause significant difficulties in addressing the presentation of the case for American judges and juries.15 American courts may balk at procedures that are not intended for the U.S. proceedings, but are rather intended instead to
make the case more effective for recognition and enforcement in Japan. In addition, there are important issues that must be addressed
in approaching the Japanese courts with the U.S. decision before
recognition and enforcement shall be provided.2 6 Still, it is clear that
more and more plaintiffs will be faced with the necessity of following this course to remedy harms suffered in the U.S. at the hands of
Japanese defendants.
II.

STRUCTURING AN AMERICAN CASE AND DECISION FOR
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT IN JAPAN

Plaintiffs and judges in the American system rarely consider
structuring their cases and decisions for effective recognition and enforcement in the Japanese system. This is particularly unfortunate
24. See HAHN, supra note 21, at 132 (stating that "[o]ne reason for the lack of private antitrust suits in Japan is the absence . . . of treble damages for victorious private plaintiffs"); J.
Amanda Covey, Vertical Restraints Under Japanese Law: The Antimonopoly Law Study Group
Report, 14 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 49, 71 (1981) (explaining that, until recently, the sole
enforcement agency of antimonopoly policy has been the JFTC, by virtue of the fact that cases
could reach the courts only after the Commission had ruled); Mackey, supra note 15, at 174 ("It
does appear that Japanese courts are ruling against punitive damages and treble damages as
against public policy."); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 628-30 (describing barriers to antitrust litigation in Japan like the "pass-on" defense and high standards of proof for damages); Rill, supra
note 9, at 646 (describing barriers to private damage actions like high filing fees, lack of discovery, and no class action lawsuits); Sanekata, supra note 9, at 396 (explaining that civil actions for
damages are ineffective because personal damages are usually nominal and it is very expensive to
litigate); see also Toshiaki Nakazawa & Leonard W. Weiss, The Legal Cartels of Japan, 34
ANTITRUST BULL. 641-43 (1989) (discussing the guidelines and requirements a cartel has to meet
in order to get JFTC approval).
25. Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 616 (explaining the large differences between U.S. and Japanese antitrust enforcement, such as sanctions).
26. See Mackey supra note 15, at 172-73 (discussing the criteria listed in article 200 of the
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure which must be fulfilled before a foreign judgment will be recognized and enforced in Japan).
27. Id. at 177 (discussing the problem a U.S. plaintiff had in enforcing a U.S. compensatory
and punitive damage award in Japan, in the case of Bryant v. Mansei Kogyo Co.); see also id. at
134 (noting that enforcing a foreign judgment in Japan can be very difficult and that "[b]efore
filing a lawsuit, the attorney must anticipate how to enforce the judgment").
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because many potentially successful American plaintiffs may be unable to obtain recoveries from defendants who have insufficient assets in the U.S. to discharge their indebtedness.2 8 Yet, where the
U.S. court has subject matter jurisdiction and obtains personal jurisdiction through service of process acceptable to both the Japanese
and the United States legal systems, a finding of a violation of U.S.
antitrust law by an American court that states both the findings of
fact and determination of law may have the potential for enforcement in Japan. 9 Of course, in order to increase the likelihood of
enforcement by Japanese courts, the successful American plaintiff
must meet both the specific criteria set forth in the Japanese Civil
Procedure Code 0 for recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions under Japanese law and the underlying special problems of
competition law that would distinguish this case from a garden variety recognition and enforcement case.
A.

The Standard For Recognition and Enforcement Under The
Japanese Civil Procedure Code

Article 20031 of the Japanese Civil Procedure Code sets forth a
fairly simple and standard set of criteria by which a foreign judgment will be measured for its recognition and enforcement by the
courts of Japan. 2 Presuming that the foreign judgment to be recognized is final and conclusive,"3 it shall be valid only upon the fulfillment of the following four criteria:
1. That the jurisdiction of the foreign court is not denied in laws,
28. Id. at 172 (noting that when a defendant has no U.S. assets, the plaintiff must attempt to
enforce the judgment in the defendant's country).
29. Id. (explaining the requirements that need to be met for a Japanese court to recognize a
judgment from a U.S. court as binding in Japan, pursuant to the criteria listed in Article 200 of
the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure).
30. Article 200 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure lists four criteria for a foreign judgment to be recognized and enforced in Japan, see infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these requirements.
31. CODE CIVIL PROCEDURE [C. CIv. PRO.] art. 200 (Japan), translated in EHS VOL. II LA.
32. See Mackey, supra note 15, at 172-73 (citing article 200 of the Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure and explaining criteria used to determine whether a foreign judgment is binding and
enforcable); accord HAHN, supra note 21, at 85.
33. The standard for finality should be easily met. See Claimant Against Japanese Learns the
Word for Delay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1990, at B2 (citing Professor Henderson who noted that
Japanese courts have enforced a number of jury trial awards); see also Sawaki, supra note 16, at
31 (stating the condition of finality could be ascertained by a certificate issued by the relevant
authority).
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orders or treaty;34
2. That the defeated Japanese defendant has received service of
summons or any other necessary orders to commence procedure otherwise by a public notice or has appeared without receiving service
35
thereof;
3. That the judgment of a foreign court is not contrary to the public
order or good morals of Japan;38
34. See Tasuku Matsuo, Jurisdictionin TransnationalCases in Japan, 23 INT'L LAW. 6, 6-7
(1989) (discussing how a Japanese court should decide whether it has the adjudicatory authority
over a transnational case); see also Sawaki, supra note 16, at 31-32 (stating it is generally accepted that the standards for the determination of direct and indirect jurisdiction should be the
same). Exercise of personal jurisdiction by U.S. courts overseas may not be so easy. Peter Nadler
& Ryan P. Parham Hadle, The Assertion of Personal Jurisdiction Over Japanese Corporations
by New York Courts, 4 PACE YEARBOOK OF INT'L LAW 319, 342-57 (1992) (analyzing five cases
where the New York Courts took personal jurisdiction over Japanese corporations); see also Robert W. Preston, Jurisdictionand the Japanese Defendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555, 579-85
(1985) (discussing the enforceability in Japan of judgments rendered in the U.S. courts).
35. See Ohara, supra note 21, at 11-18 (discussing various methods of providing service of
process in Japan for proceedings initiated in the United States); see also JOHN H. MERRYMAN,
DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND
EAST ASIA 93-96 (1994); Fujita, Service, supra note 18, at 72 (explaining that the sufficiency of
service of process upon the Japanese national will be examined under Japanese concepts and standards); Sawaki, supra note 16, at 32-33 (explaining that the condition of adequate service of
process is based on the requisite fairness, justice, and due process). Japan is a signatory to the
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (The Hague Service Convention) and service is proper if it adheres to the Convention
rules. For the specific rules applicable, see The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force with the U.S. on February 10, 1969, and with Japan on July 27,
1970).
36. Note that Japan's concept of public policy is broader than the United States and requires
analysis of the foreign court's procedural laws, as well as substantive laws. Thus, a Japanese court
may refuse to recognize and enforce a foreign court's judgment if it finds the foreign court's
procedures violative of public policy. See Sawaki, supra note 16, at 33 (identifying problems with
this criterion such as whether this compatibility test applies only to the substance of the foreign
judgment or extends to procedure, and whether a conflict between a domestic and a foriegn judgment is deemed to be against public policy within the meaning of Article 200 of CCP); see also
Itsuko Mori, The Difference Between U.S. Discovery and Japanese Taking of Evidence, 23 INT'L
LAW. 3, 3-4 (1989) (discussing general differences between U.S. and Japanese discovery of evidence). The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial. Matters (Hague Evidence Convention), Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, 241
(entered into force with the U.S. on October 7, 1972; has not entered into force with Japan)
(allowing judicial officers of Contracting States to request "competent authority of another Contracting State" to obtain evidence according to the rules spelled out in the treaty). Although
Japan has no blocking statute against extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law for discovery, Japanese Ministers may use administrative guidance to instruct Japanese companies not to
comply with U.S. orders to produce documents located outside the U.S. by administrative guidance. This "instruction" has almost the same function as law to Japanese companies. Ohara,
supra note 21, at 27-28. 1 believe that while this might be a hostile but arguably reasonable
defensive response to an extraterritorial reach by the U.S., the application of blocking statutes to
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4. That there is mutual guarantee.3 7
These criteria have been examined and applied by Japanese courts
to plaintiffs seeking recognition and enforcement of U.S. cases, as
well as interpreted by Japanese and American scholars. For example, in Burroughs Corp. v. Taeyong Chung (a/k/a Tei Tai Ryu), the
Tokyo District Court recognized and enforced a decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.3 8 The Tokyo District Court found that the decision in the case the plaintiff
submitted was final and conclusive and that the foreign judgment
fulfilled all of the requisites of Article 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan. 9 The court easily found that as for item 1 of Article 200 [jurisdiction of a foreign court] there was no law, order or
treaty which intends to deny in general the competence of a foreign
court as to a civil case in our country. 0 Clearly, this would also be
true for virtually all antitrust cases in U.S. courts.
Next, the court addressed item 2 of Article 200 [appropriate service of process or voluntary appearance]."' The court declared that
since the defendant was not Japanese ["defendant defeated, being
Japanese.

.

.],4

when the action was brought in the U.S. court,

this item was not applicable.43 Although many implications may be
drawn from this finding, most significantly it implies that non-Japanese defendants will not be provided the same service of process
standards as Japanese citizens. Nevertheless, the court found that
whether or not the defendant was Japanese, item 2 was fulfilled because the defendant actually had received the personal service and
traditional domestic antitrust cases shows a blatant lack of comity and good faith. Also, the new
Horei states Japan's public policy: "The law of a foreign country shall not govern if the application of its provisions are contrary to public policy and good morals." Chin Kim, New Japanese
Private International Law: The 1990 Horei, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 25 (1992). Consider the signifi-

cance of the AMA in this scheme.
37. See Sawaki, supra note 16, at 34 (discussing the holding of the Supreme Court of Japan,
37 Minshu 611, that there is reciprocity "where, in the country in which the foriegn court rendering the judgment is situated, the same type of judgment as rendered by a Japanese court would
have effect under conditions not different in import from those prescribed in article 200."); see
also HAHN, supra note 21, at 86 (stating that "Japanese courts on several occasions emphatically
reaffirmed that American judgments satisfy the Japanese requirement of reciprocity").
38. Burroughs Corp. v. Taeyong Chung, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1979, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 25 THE
JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (1982) [hereinafter Burroughs].
39. Id. at 203.
40. Id. at 201.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 203.
43. Id.
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appeared in the U.S. court." However, vigilance in addressing item
2 can not be overstated. Strict adherence to Japanese criteria for
effective service of process is essential. "' Plaintiffs must not be seduced into believing that because Japan did not object to the use of
service of process by mail in the Hague Convention for the Service
of Process," that such service is acceptable for Japanese courts in
either original jurisdiction or recognition and enforcement situations.' 7 As for item 3, the Burroughs court found that since the foreign decision involved an account for credit sale, it was not contrary
to public order or good morals in Japan." Finally, in addressing
item 4, the court set forth prior decisions in the U.S. [Hilton v.
Guyot] and Japan [Decision of Daishinin, December 5, 1933
Horitsu Shimbun, No. 3670 at 16] for the principle that "it is reasonable to consider that there exists between our country [Japan]
and the District of Columbia, U.S.A. the reciprocity prescribed in
Article 200, Item 4 of the Civil Procedure Code of Japan."' 9
Therefore, although the party requesting the recognition and enforcement of a U.S. decision which is final and conclusive must
meet each of these criteria, only the third one - "public policy" should be a factor in the recognition and enforcement of a properly
prepared United States antitrust case. 60 Japan accepts the rule that
review for recognition should not include looking behind the ele44. Id. at 201; see also Mackey supra note 15, at 173 (noting that under subsection 2 of article
200, if a Japanese defendant makes an appearance, the subsection is satisfied, regardless of
service).
45. See Ohara supra note 21, at 13 (noting that the Japanese Central Authority "does not
accept request from foreign courts if the forms for request are incomplete, documents not translated into Japanese in cases of service in the manner prescribed by Japanese law or in a special
manner, or service affords insufficient time to enable the defendant to defend. The number of such
unexecuted requests is considerable.").
46. The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, Article X(a), 20 U.S.T. 361, 363, 658 U.N.T.S.
163, 169 (entered into force with the United States on Feb. 10, 1969, and with Japan on July 27,
1970)("Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with - (a) the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad . .").
47. See Ohara supra note 21, at 14-16.
48. Burroughs, supra note 38, at 201-02.
49. Id. at 203.
50. Kim, supra note 36, at 1, 6. (noting that "[i]n
a few exceptional cases, the application of
foreign law is to be set aside if it is repugnant to fundamental principles of public order and
morality of the Japanese polity"); see also Fujita, Japanese Regulation, supra note 4, at 339 ("In
a proceeding for the enforcement of a foreign award or judgment, the defendant may plead a
defense based on the Anti-Monopoly Law, since it constitutes a strong public policy of Japan
.)

.
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ments in the decision."' However, because public policy is defined
much more broadly in Japan than the U.S., 8 2 it provides an opportunity for the Japanese courts to examine both the findings of fact and
the determinations of law as they relate to the violation of the law
and the damage award. In addition, other relevant code provisions
support the right to exclude judicial decisions that violate public
policy.

58

B.

The Anti-Monopoly Act And Private Enforcement of
Japanese Competition Law

The recognition and enforcement of a U.S. antitrust decision may
very well involve an examination by the Japanese courts (for public
policy purposes) of the comparability of the United States and Japanese competition law. 54 American antitrust law appears and, for the
most part, is consonant with Japanese competition law."8 The Japa51. See Sawaki, 775, supra note 16, at 30 (stating that if a decision is deemed to meet the
requirements of article 200 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, a court will then usually
accept the decision as enforceable).
52. The role of the judge in shaping and interpreting public policy in Japan is quite substantial.
For a general discussion of the history and development of theories of judicial interpretation and
decision-making in Japan, see Hiroshi Itoh, How Judges Think in Japan, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 775804 (1970); see also Sawaki, supra note 16, at 30-31 (noting that in Japan "judgments are classified into three categories, namely, civil affairs judgments, criminal affairs judgments, and administrative affairs judgments. Among them, only the civil affairs judgments are recognized and enforced"); Jiukichi Koshikawa, Principles of Equity in the Japanese Civil Law, 11 INT'L LAW.
307, 308 (1973) (discussing the equitable principle of public welfare that "constitutes the backbone of the civl law;" private rights are subordinate to the public welfare "the people try on their
rights to the extent that such exercise does not interfere with the public welfare"). E.g., in the
measurement of equity, because the doctrine of "abuse of rights" (defined as an improper exercise
of one's right contrary to social order) may be in stark contrast to the American concept of the
vindication of individual rights, the Japanese courts may examine carefully the fairness and justice
of the recognition and enforcement of a decision on Japanese law and social order generally.
53. See e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 90 (translated in EHS Vol. II FA-FAA) (Japan).
54. See Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 616.
55. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, (1985)
("Moreover, while our attachment to the antitrust laws may be stronger than most, many other
countries, including Japan, have similar bodies of competition law."); WILBUR FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS §16.13, at 508 (4th ed. 1991) ("The present law, [the
AMA], which still has many similarities to the U.S. Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts prohibits monopoly, unfair business practices and unreasonable restraints of trade.");
HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 11 (1983) ("The [Antimonopoly] Act was patterned after the United States antitrust laws, previously the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act."); First, supra note 11, at 67 ("It
is time to recognize that the Antimonopoly Act is as much a part of Japan's legal system as any of
the other laws which, at that time, Japan borrowed from the West."); Sanekata, supra note 9, at
380 ("Japan's basic antimonopoly statute was enacted in 1947 on the model of the antitrust regime of the United States."). However, although the AMA is based on U.S. antitrust law, the
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nese legal establishment has clearly accepted and applied the underlying values of both U.S. and European competition law theories. 66
A review of the Anti-monopoly Act8 7 (hereafter "AMA") will reveal whether the violation found in the U.S. decision is one that is
contemplated in the AMA. Of course, although the violation need
not be one found among those listed in the AMA, 58 a consonant
provision will assist in eliminating this difference as a ground for
claiming it is against public policy to recognize and enforce in Japan
as illegal those activities that are legal within Japan."9
Japanese interpretation of the AMA differs substantially from the U.S. experience. See Hamabe,
supra note 4, at 916, 922-23 ("Overall, prohibited trade practies under U.S. and Japanese law are
substantially similar, even though actual commercial practices in each country may be quite different."); Iyori, supra note 7, at 61 ("Japan's Antimonopoly Law was enacted in 1947 under the
strong influence of U.S. antitrust laws. Although these laws continue to share many fundamental
similarities, considerable differences have developed over time."); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at
604, 616 (observing that although the Japanese Antimonopoly Act prohibits most acts that are
illegal under American antitrust law, American and Japanese antitrust policies sharply diverge at
the point of enforcement); Seita & Tamura, supra note 5, at 122 ("Although the aims of American and Japanese antitrust laws appear similar, interpretations of similar laws can, and will, diverge in the context of different legal and business traditions."). Professor Haley notes that although the systems have a great deal in common, the Japanese enforcement structure differs
significantly from the U.S. because it is the appropriate one for that society. Haley, Enforcement,
supra note 3, at 317-18. He further emphasizes that the introduction of U.S. enforcement techniques will be much more detrimental to foreign companies than Japanese companies. Id. at 322;
see also John Williams III, Note, The Sun Rises Over the Pacific: The Dissolution of Statutory
Barriers to the Japanese Market for U.S. Joint Ventures, 22 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 441,
452-57 (1991) (discussing the Antimonopoly Act's conferral of regulatory power on the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission and FTC guidelines on license provisions, noncompetition clauses, and
quality

control

provisions); MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY

LAW 5-10 (1990) (discussing generally three categories of conduct prohibited by the AMA). See
generally ELEANOR HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970) (discussing the historical, particularly
post-war development of antimonopoly measures in Japan).
56. See, HAHN, supra note 21, at II (noting that Japan's commercial legal system was modeled
primarily after the American and German systems). For example, Japan's rules of jurisdiction
found in the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure are nearly identical to those of the German Code
of Civil Procedure. Id. at 81; see also M.K. Taxi Co. v. Ministry of Transport, 1143 JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS REV.

46 (Osaka Dist. Ct. Jan. 31, 1985).

57. Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade,
translated in EHS VOL.II KA-KJ. In addition to the AMA, the JFTC regulates unfair business
practices under two supplementary laws - the Subcontract Price Delayed Payment Prevention Act
and the Improper Premiums and Improper Representation Prevention Act. A discussion of these
two supplementary laws is beyond the scope of this article. For an overview of these supplemental
laws, see Akinori Uesugi, Supplemental Laws in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, Part IX, Chapter
9, §§ 9.01-9.03 (Zentaro Kitagawa, ed. 1992).
58. But cf. Fujita, Service, supra note 18, at 71 (noting that some scholars argue that "any
foreign money judgment must be enforced in Japan, be it based on illegal or immoral
transactions").
59. See Fujita, Japanese Regulation, supra note 4, at 339 (discussing the Amano Pharmaceutical K.K. case); Hamabe, supra note 4, at 918 n.101. ("Therefore, the antimonopoly issues in
Japan should be discussed under the AMA, not under U.S. antitrust laws."); Kim, supra note 36,
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Article 25 of the AMA permits private parties to bring a private
damage claim for an antitrust violation when Japan's Fair Trade
Commission (hereafter "JFTC") has issued a final order of violation
of competition law against the same defendant.60 However, there are
very few opportunities to bring Article 25 cases due to the JFTC's
regular use of administrative guidance, informal dispute resolution
mechanisms and negotiated settlements.6" Further, foreign plaintiffs
at 7 (noting that prior to the 1990 revision of the Horei, "[fOacts alleged to be tortious under
foreign law must also have been wrongful under Japanese law. Even if the act in question constitutes a tort under both foreign and Japanese law, the injured person cannot institute an action"
for damages or remedies not prescribed for under Japanese law).
60. Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade,
Art. 25 translated in EHS Vol. II KA-KJ. Any "injured party by private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade or unfair trade practice" may file "damage remedy suits" under Section
25 of the AMA. Akira Negishi, Recent Developments in the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, Helmut
Coing and Others (ed.) Staat Und Unternehmen aus der Sicht des Rechts (1994 J.C.B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck) Tubingen), 145-59. However, the JFTC plays a significant part even in the "private" action under Section 25 because Section 25 provides strict liability, only after the JFTC's
decision is final and conclusive. Id. Furthermore, "[u]nder section 84 of the Antimonopoly Act,
the Toyko High Court requests the opinion of the FTC on the amount of damages caused by the
violation." Id.; see also AMA, sec. 84, EHS II (KA 46).
61. "Administrative guidance" is called gyosei shido in Japan. Wolfgang Pape, Gyosei Shiaf
and the Antimonopoly Law, 15 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 12, 12 (1982). It is defined as "the
means by which administrative organs exercise influence by nonauthoritative means without binding legal directives in order to guide the recipient by way of consent and cooperation towards the
realization of administrative aims by positive act or omission." Id. at 14. This "administrative
guidance" is prevalent in Japan. Id. at 12. For a discussion of the Antimonopoly Act and gyosei
shido, see id. at 17-23; see Ramseyer, supra note 11,at 637-43 (discussing how the Japanese
perceive their society as "consensual and harmonious" and that this perception perpetuates and
legitimizes the bureaucratic rule in Japan which creates an institutional barrier to litigation);
Sanekata, supra note 9, at 397-98 ("The JFTC has been dealing effectively with many investigations but there have been relatively few formal proceedings. There have also been few recommendations, although informal warnings against violators have been issued frequently. Such warnings
have been used in order to avoid the difficulty of proving violations."); see also IYORI & UEsUGI,
supra note 55, at 121-28 (discussing the JFTC's administrative, civil and criminal procedures);
Hamabe, supra note 4, at 917 (discussing the broad administrative and enforcement powers of the
JFTC). In order for the JFTC to act where there is an alleged illegal restraint of trade, Article 2
(5) requires that the restraint be "contrary to the public interest" (not unlike the standard in
Article 200 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure). Matsushita, supra note 4, at 61. There are two
theories as to the meaning of public interest: the JFTC, courts and scholars assert that public
interest is "the maintenance of competition for its own sake, and that therefore, the public interest
is harmed whenever free competition is substantially restrained in any market." Id. Alternatively,
both MITI and the business leadership assert that the public interest is harmed when a possibly
anticompetitive plan is not otherwise beneficial for the society. Id. at 62. For a description of the
methods of enforcement of the JFTC and private enforcement, see id. at 72-73; see also Iyori,
supra note 7, at 79-80 (noting that in this respect the U.S. and Japanese competition law is the
same); Seita & Tamura, supra note 5, at 124 (explaining that the JFTC primarily uses "nontransparent methods" of administering the AMA such as unofficially notifying entitites of possible
violations before engaging in formal investigation); Hamabe, supra note 4, at 917 (discussing
steps a prospective party entering into an international contract should take with the JFTC to
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may not even have the standing to use Article 25 due to their lack
of legal presence in Japan under Japanese law.62 There have been
only seven cases, all unsuccessful, brought under Article 25 in the
nearly half century since its passage. 63 Of the seven cases, even
ensure it is not violating the Antimonopoly Act).
62. See HAHN, supra note 21, at 61-62 (discussing the Novo Indus., Ltd. v. JFTC case) (Judgment of Nov. 28, 1975, Supreme Court of Japan, 29 Minshu 15)). The Novo case involved a
Danish company attempting to nullify a JFTC order issued to a Japanese company. Id. at 61. The
Danish and the Japanese companies had entered into a technology assistance agreement that contained a provision that the Japanese company would not manufacture similar competitive products
within three years after the termination of the contract. Id. at 62. After signing the contract, the
JFTC ordered the Japanese company to strike out the provision because the JFTC held it violated
the AMA. Id. The Danish company was not notified of the proceedings. Id. The Japanese company gladly consented to the decree, since it now could violate the provision of the contract. Id.
The Danish company appealed the JFTC's order. Id. However, the Toyko High Court dismissed
the action, holding that a third party to the proceedings (the Danish company) had no standing to
appeal the order against the Japanese company since it was at best only "indirectly" affected by
the order. Id. It represents a "rarity" in the law where a foreign company, who was truly the
defendant, could not intervene in the matter because it had no standing. Id.; accord Hamabe,
supra note 4, at 918-19 ("[T]he Supreme Court denied Novo's [the Danish party] standing, reasoning that a JFTC recommendation was binding on the Japanese respondent party who had
accepted the recommendation but was not binding on any third party, including Novo, a foreign
party."); Fujita, Japanese Regulation, supra note 4, at 339-40 (discussing the Novo case); see
also Lipsky, supra note 5, at 285-87 (commenting on the draft guidelines and U.S. response);
Matsushita, supra note 4, at 74-75 (discussing Komatsu-Bucyrus case in which "FTC must have
jurisdiction over the foreign party, which means that personal jurisdiction, discovery jurisdiction
and enforcement jurisdiction requirements must be satisfied as regards such foreign party. Satisfying such requirements is often a very difficult task"). Further, none of the cases cited in JFTC
guidelines involve a complaint by a foreign firm. Peter B. Edelman, JapaneseStandards as NonTariff Trade Barriers: When Regulatory Policy Becomes a Trade Issue, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 389,
442 (1988) ("Significantly, none of the cases cited in the guidelines involved a complaint by a
foreign firm."). However, foreign firms in Japan may have reason to fear that a complaint to
Japan's Fair Trade Commission "JFTC" will bring retaliation from the ministries involved in the
supervision of the industry or company complained about. Id.
63. It has been reported that between 1947, and April, 1990, there were only seven private
cases brought under Article 25 of the AMA and only nine cases under Article 709 of the Civil
Code. Iyori, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that although only seven cases were brought under the
AMA, it "continues to be very difficult for plaintiffs to prove violations of the Antimonopoly Law
and the resulting damages"). Plaintiffs won no suits (lost-12, settled-2, withdrew-l, joint cases-I).
Id.; see also Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 617-27 (reporting that between 1947-1985, there were
only seven private antitrust damage suits filed and that besides the two plaintiffs who settled, the
others did not collect any compensation). The one victory by antitrust plaintiffs came in 1985, in
the Tsuruoka Oil case, where a Japanese appellate court reversed a lower court decision that had
ruled against plaintiff's challenge to price-fixing in the oil industry. Hamabe, supra note 4, at 90910 & nn. 42-47. However, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed and denied liability for failing to
prove damages. Id. Professor Young was prescient when he declared this the exception that proves
the rule. "Private enforcement, moreover, is almost unheard of, with the exception that proves the
rule being a recent decision of the Sendai High Court reversing a lower-court decision that had
held against plaintiffs who were seeking damages for alleged price fixing by members of the oil
industry." Michael K. Young, Comment in FRAGILE INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 11, at 77.
The court not only held the private plaintiffs to a strict evidence rule in the civil action, but
declared that the JFTC's recommendation decision does not bind the court. See Hamabe, supra
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those where the plaintiff seemed likely to succeed have been lost due
to the limited discovery for antitrust plaintiffs, and the extremely
burdensome, almost insurmountable, standards of proof for harm as
well as damages under Japanese law. 64
Recently, a significant avenue of potential redress for private antitrust injuries (Article 709 ((Tort)) of the Civil Code) that previously had been thought to be closed was opened. 65 Although all nine
prior attempts to use Article 709 had been unsuccessful,66 in the
note 4, at 910. However, recommendation decisions are not a part of adjudicated practice. Id. at
912 n.65. Further, the Japanese Supreme Court has ruled that an act in violation of the AMA is
not necessarily null and void in terms of Civil Law. ODA, JAPANESE LAW. supra note 6, at 147.
64. See lyori, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that although the JFTC announced in 1991 its intention to facilitate discovery in actions brought under the AMA, it "continues to be very difficult for
plaintiffs to prove violations of the Antimonopoly Law and the resulting damages"); Ramseyer,
supra note 11, at 617-34 (discussing three cases where private plaintiffs in antitrust suits had
difficulty proving damages); Sanekata, supra note 9, at 396-97 (noting that most civil actions
against cartels have been unsucessful because of the difficulty in proving proximate causation
between illegal cartels and price levels during cartel periods). Compare Nijenhuis, supra note 3,
at 1013-16 (discussing how expansive discovery in America is often "percieved by foreigners as a
tool that can be used to undermine a country's sovereignty"). However, in 1991, the JFTC published guidelines to help private parties obtain access to JFTC investigation materials to prove
facts. Hamabe, supra note 4, at 910. In addition, upon the court's request, the JFTC has offered
to assist in providing documentation of violations and the amounts of damages. Id.; see also Peter
B. Maretz, Antimonopoly Enforcement, 12 EAST ASIAN EXEc. RPTS. 8, 8 (1990) (noting that in
issuing the guidelines, the JFTC, "intended to aid plaintiffs in overcoming the extremely high
burden of proof placed on them in a private enforcement action").
65. "A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is bound to make
compensation for damages arising therefrom." C. Civ. art. 709 (Japan), translatedin in EHS Vol.
II FA-FAA; see also Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 623 n.108 (quoting same statute). Such an
antitrust theory for sec. 709 was suggested by the Japanese Supreme Court in 1972. See id. at
623 n.109 (citing Judgment of Nov. 16, 1972, (Ebisu Shokuhin Kigyo Kumiai v. Kosei Torihiki
linkai), Japan Sup. Ct., 26 Sai-han Minshu 1573, 1576, as the first case where the Supreme
Court suggested this theory). However, it was not until 1981, in the Sato v. Sekiyu Renmei case
that plaintiffs relied on the tort theory of Article 709. Id. at 623; see also Mitsuo Matsushita,
Court Proceedings in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, Part IX, Chapter 11, 6, § 11.03 (Zentaro
Kitagawa, ed., 1992),("Although there was some controversy as to whether a person who has been
injured by conduct which may constitute a violation of the Antimonopoly Act may bring an Article 709 tort claim, recent decisions support such a claim."); Covey, supra note 24, at 78 (discussing how a district court in the Tsuruoka Oil Cartel case held that consumers had a direct cause of
action under article 709 for damages resulting from the AMA; however the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove proximate cause). In early discussions about
private action for antitrust damages under article 709, scholars thought this opportunity was
rather hollow. Fujita, JapaneseRegulation, supra note 4, at 344-45 ("The fact that the FTC has
decided not to take any action against the alleged violator is very likely to be presumed by a civil
court to be prima facie evidence that the allegation is not well-grounded.. .. the court's assumption that one can go to a civil court and get damages is rather empty.").
66. See Iyori, supra note 7, at 85 (noting that only nine cases have been filed under Article 709
and none have been successful). But cf Recent legal actions by private parties in Japan indicate a
slight increase in private antitrust enforcement activities in non-financial recovery cases (i.e.
avoiding terminations of current business relations and cut-off of supplies). See Kosugi, supra note
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Toshiba Elevator case6 7 the Osaka High Court permitted a private
plaintiff to recover for damages in a trade injury situation.6 8 This
award was made based on a tying arrangement that had been the
subject of a prior proceeding under the AMA, in which the JFTC
had merely issued a warning to Toshiba regarding its policies of
supplying parts for its elevators.6 9 Although the award was small,70
this case acknowledged for the first time that private parties may
sue privately for anticompetitive harm rather than use Article 25 of
the AMA. 1 Most significantly, Article 709 can serve as a valuable
support for a U.S. antitrust decision that has been brought to Japan
for recognition and enforcement.

III.

CONFORMING THE U.S. CASE

To

MEET JAPANESE

STANDARDS

There are several issues that an attorney must face in preparing
for the possibility that a U.S. antitrust decision may need recognition and enforcement in Japan. Although these issues all revolve
around the concept of public policy as stated in Article 200 above,7
each issue needs to be addressed prior to the initiation of the U.S.
9, at 5-6 (summarizing the line of cases in Japan that indicated the judiciary was gradually considering more aggressive enforcement of the AMA through civil litigation). However, the JFTC's
failure to see a violation in the Shiseido case apparently led to a reversal at the High Court level.
Id. On appeal to the Japanese Supreme Court, it will be interesting to see whether the influence
of JFTC action (or inaction) will be observed or even commented upon. For a brief discussion of
the Shiseido case and the cases preceeding the decision, see id. at 5-6.
67. Toshiba Elevator v. Touzuki [unreported case], Osaka High Court, No. 1660 (1993). A
summary of the facts is provided in William R. Andersen, Kodak and Aftermarket Tying Analysis: Some Comparative Thoughts, 23-25, Competition and Trade Policy Project, Port Ludlow,
WA (Mar. 18-21, 1994).
68. See Hamabe, supra note 4, at 909 n.41 (noting that a rare decision was handed down in
1993, when the Osaka District Court granted a damage award in favor of the plaintiff against a
subsidiary of an elevator manufacturer "on the basis of a general tort involving a violation of the
AMA").
69. See Andersen, supra note 67, at 23 (explaining that Toshiba, one of six elevator manufac-

turers in Japan, refused to sell parts for its elevators unless the buyer also bought repair and
maintenance service.); see also Hamabe, supra note 4, at 909 n.41 (noting that the plaintiff, a
building owner with a Toshiba elevator, was prevented from using the elevator because of the
defendant's unfair transactions and tying arrangement. The court held these practices violated the
AMA).
70. See Hamabe, supra note 4, at 909 n.41; see also Andersen, supra note 67, at 295-98.

71. See Hamabe, supra note 4, at 909 & n.41 (noting that "consumers have never won in civil
actions for damages premised upon a violation of the AMA," except in the Toshiba Elevator
case).

72. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing the "public policy" requirement
in Article 200).
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proceeding.
A.

ProceduralIssues

As noted above, it is important that the U.S. plaintiff use the personal jurisdiction and service of process standards set out by Article
200 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the
Japanese courts. 73 This requires avoiding the temptation to use
American methods of service of process that are unacceptable practices in Japan .7 This will prevent the unsuccessful defendant from
using technical procedure issues to delay the addressing of the major
policy issues by the court. Although default judgments may be enforced 75 naturally Japanese courts are quite suspicious about default cases and will be particularly concerned about jurisdictional
and service issues.7 6 Most importantly, the possibility of "double action" must be faced." Plaintiffs must be prepared to submit to the
Japanese courts a large sum of money that will be escrowed for defendants if the plaintiff should fail to prove its case. 8 This sum may
79
be used to compensate the defendant for court costs.
73. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text & supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text
(discussing the jurisdiction and service of process requirements and how the Japanese courts have
interpreted them).
74. See supra note 35 (discussing what types of service are acceptable in Japan). For example,
transient jurisdiction, service by mail, or service upon an American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation may be unacceptable methods of service in Japan. See generally Fujita, Service supra
note 18, at 69-81 (discussing the Japanese concepts and rules for service of process).
75. But see Fujita, Service, supra note 18, at 69 (noting that default judgments awarded in the
U.S. may not be enforced in Japan if the Japanese courts find lack of service according to Japanese law).
76. Id.
77. Double action occurs when a foreign plaintiff initiates a claim in a country outside Japan,
and before the judgment is rendered, the Japanese defendant (now a plaintiff) brings suit in Japan, seeking a judicial declaration as to the non-existence of facts to support the claim that is the
basis of the foreign action. Sawaki, supra note 16, at 34-35 (discussing the Kansai-Tekko case as
a perfect example of "double action"). Once the Japanese court has concluded that there is no
liability and enters a judgment for the Japanese party, the presentation of the subsequently decided foreign suit for recognition and enforcement must be rejected on public policy grounds (e.g.
res judicata). Id. at 35 (noting that double action of this kind works "as a tool to prevent possible
enforcement of foreign judgments"). Although this practice is condemned by many parts of the
legal community in Japan, American attorneys must be vigilant to insure that their clients are not
caught in this trap for the unwary. See also Fujita, Service, supra note 18, at 71 n.6 & 81
(discussing the Kansai v. Tekko case as a perfect example of "double action" and asserting that
the simplest way to sue the Japanese defendant is to just bring suit in Japan).
78. CODE CIVIL PROCEDURE [C. CIv. PRO.] art. 89 (translated in EHS Vol. II LA) (Japan);
see C. CiV. PRO. art. 107-17 (translated in EHS Vol. II LA) (Japan).
79. Id.; see also Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understandingthe Incidence of
Litigation in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAW. 443, 453 (1991).
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B. Public Policy Issues
The division of public and private law in both the American and
Japanese legal systems will form a core element that must be addressed prior to and during the U.S. antitrust case as well as in
preparation for the recognition and enforcement part of the Japanese case. First, Japanese law, much like that of many civil law
countries, divides public and private law at a much different place
than the law of the United States.8" Competition law is generally
cast as a public law issue that leaves the predominant part of enforcement to the government." Therefore, in addition to showing
the same philosophical grounding in the competition law of both the
United States and Japan, and the consonance of the two countries'
antitrust law statutes and codes, several factors must be addressed
to overcome the Japanese predisposition to deny the power of a private party to act in competition law cases.8 " Further, this public/
80. See Fujita, Japanese Regulation, supra note 4, at 318 (noting that government regulations
carry severe public law sanctions, while Japanese judges are reluctant to give effect to these same
regulations in the private law domain); Ottley & Ottley, supra note 12, at 40 (noting that the
Japanese legal system does not encourage private persons to become involved in law enforcement,
but rather views intervention in areas that require protection of the public as the exclusive function of the government); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 605-06 (noting that the Japanese preference
for public enforcement over private litigation is in sharp contrast to the U.S.); Report of the
Consultant, supra note 4, at 362-63 & 368 (describing the debate by American scholars about
whether private or public enforcement of antitrust law is more appropriate and outlining the international implications of private treble damage actions in the United States); see also, Haley,
Enforcement, supra note 3, at 311 (noting that in civil law countries, like Japan, administrative
enforcement agencies are responsible for enforcing administrative orders and decisions, while in
the U.S., the judiciary is more involved in enforcement). See generally JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER

19-24 (1991) (providing an explanation of Japan's evolution into a

"public law regime" as compared to the West's focus on private law and a judicial process of
enforcement).
81. See Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 617-18 (noting, for example, that a plaintiff may sue
under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act only after the Fair Trade Commission has issued a final
administrative order against the defendant); Ottley & Ottley, supra note 12, at 35-36 (citing
reasons for the reluctance of Japanese to resort to the courts to resolve disputes); see also
Hamabe, supra note 4, at 910-11 (noting that private antitrust actions in Japan are very limited
and will only "supplement antimonopoly policy"); Fujita, Japanese Regulation, supra note 4, at
338-39 (noting that undue restraints of trade are closely scrutinized by the JFTC); Report of the
Consultant, supra note 4, at 362-63 (describing the debate among American scholars over
whether private or public enforcement of antitrust violations is most appropriate).
82. See HAHN, supra note 21, at 132-33 (stating that Japanese prohibition against class action
damage suits, the limited methods of discovery, the high standards of proof of violations and
damages, and the high costs of litigation are "all factors that suggest that private suits under the
civil code will, . . . not be an active force in Japanese antitrust law enforcement in the future");
see also Hamabe, supra note 4, at 910-11 (noting that civil actions in antitrust actions "will be
more widely used only after the adoption of more effective methods to utilize civil lawsuits or the
emergence of more civil precedents in the Japanese litigation system"); Ottley & Ottley, supra
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private dichotomy will be a major issue in the examination of what
is the appropriate standard for the assessment of damages.8 3
In German and French law, unlike American law, the ubiquitous
role of the government in vast areas of business reflects the historical significance of public law in these societies.8 4 In particular, unnote 12, at 38-39 (noting that long delays and lack of discovery tools serve as significant procedural deterrents to complex litigation in Japan); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 607 (noting that
"perhaps no concept permeates discussions of the Japanese legal system so deeply as the notion
that Japanese do not sue because of a 'nonlitigious ethos' "); see also Fujita, JapaneseRegulation,
supra note 4, at 344-45 (noting that where a JFTC review results in a decision of no action
against an alleged violator of the Anti-Monopoly law, a civil court is very likely to view a private
party's allegations as groundless); Hamabe, supra note 4, at 919 & n.108 (noting that who the
parties are can make a difference because the effects of administrative law and private law can be
different); Report of the Consultant, supra note 4, at 368 (describing in general, the foreign
hostility toward enforcing treble damage suits directed at their nationals).
83. But cf Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 611 (noting that Japanese bureaucrats may have failed
to serve their own public by underenforcement). An interesting alternative in some cases to the
potential private U.S. antitrust litigation might be the use of an international arbitration tribunal.
For a discussion of this alternative, see Jill A. Pietrowski, Comment, Enforcing International
Commercial Arbitration Agreements- Post- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AMER. U. L. REV. 57 (1986). Japanese courts have enforced foreign arbitration
awards and judgments even when violative of the former Foreign Exchange Control Law. Fujita,
Japanese Regulations, supra note 4, at 325. "But Japanese courts have held that the prohibitions
and restrictions in the Control Law and related orders do not embody a strong public policy." Id.
Clearly, the U.S. accepted such jurisdiction as an independent forum for the resolution of the
dispute so long as U.S. antitrust law is applied, if appropriate. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (upholding arbitration clause in an argument
embodying an international commercial transaction even where clause would have been invalid in
a domestic antitrust context). Interestingly, the court in Mitsubishi assumed that an international
tribunal would award the U.S. treble damages remedy for violation of its antitrust law, since the
court indicated that arbitrators must decide a dispute "in accord with the national law giving rise
to the claim." Id. at 637. However, "most arbitral tribunals address contractual issues and tend
not to award damages in excess of reasonable commercial compensation for actual, unavoidable
injury." Pietrowski, supra, at 87-88. But cf Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 63
U.S.L.W. 4195 (Mar. 6, 1995) (finding that punitive damages may be applied in arbitration). If
arbitration awards do provide for treble damages, Japanese courts may be forced to recognize and
enforce the foreign arbitral decree pursuant to its obligation under the New York Convention. Id.
at 69 (noting that the Convention's goal is to encourage recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards). Of course, there is a "public policy" clause in the Convention which may be the
basis of denial of both the decision and award or either. See id. (noting that a court may refuse
enforcement if an award would be contrary to the public policy of the forum state); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §488, Reporters' Notes, Note 2
(ALl, 1986) (noting that the public policy defense has been narrowly construed by courts in the
United States). The Japanese business community, however, still rarely resorts to arbitration. See
Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Disputes Provisions In
International Business Contracts: Recent Developments In Arbitration and Other Processes, 45
Bus. LAW. 577, 621 (1990) (noting that recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards may
be subject to the policy of the country where enforcement is sought).
84. See Ottley & Ottley, supra note 12, at 40 & n.63 (citing the Japanese Antimonopoly Law
as an example of the civil law preference for government regulation over private involvement). For
a discussion of the relationship between tort and criminal law in civil law jurisdictions, see JA
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less a matter is totally private, governmental action protects these
societies against most anticompetitive and other improper trade behavior.8 5 Although the Japanese AMA bears a marked resemblance
to American antitrust law, because most modern Japanese law is
based on German and other civil law, it is not surprising that Japan
follows the civil law model as to the role of public law.86 Therefore,
under Japanese law, only the government can use punitive damages
and criminal sanctions for anticompetitive behavior.8 7 The Japanese
law that provides for tort action to recover for individual harm suffered due to unfair trade practice activities appears to provide only
exactly provable damages. 88 Conversely, the American system atJolowicz, Procedural Questions in XI

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE

LAW,

Torts, Part II, Chapter XIII, 3-15 (Andre Tunc, ed. 1986); see also Fujita, Japanese Regulation,
supra note 4, at 319 (noting the traditional importance of public law in civil law countries).
85. For a discussion of the government's role in antitrust enforcement in Japan, see supra note
81 and accompanying text; see also Nijenhuis, supra note 3, at 1017 (noting that except for the
United States, "control of the economy through enforcement of antitrust law ... generally rests
in the hands of government agencies"). However, "[s]ince the AMA has no substantial evidence
provisions, even final JFTC adjudicated decisions do not bind courts in civil lawsuits." Hamabe,
supra note 4, at 909; Fujita, Japanese Regulations, supra note 4, at 338-45 (discussing how a
private plaintiff is virtually left without a remedy for an AMA violation, unless the JFTC decides
to get involved); see also John 0. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative
Study of German and Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471, 473 (1984) [hereinafter Haley,
Antitrust Sanctions] (discussing criminal and administrative sanctions imposed by the Japanese
and German governments for improper, anticompetitive trade behavior).
86. Limits on law enforcement powers of the JFTC are to some extent shared by all civil law
systems. See Haley, Enforcement, supra note 3, at 312 (noting that the "investigatory powers of
U.S. enforcement authorities are considerably broader and more coercive than any of their counterparts in Japan or Europe"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 488, Reporters' Notes, Note I (American Law Institute, 1986) (noting
that laws of most states consider "public law issues such as antitrust..." to be outside the scope
of arbitration); Haley, Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 85, at 472 (noting that German law was
the principal model for Japan's legal reforms during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
87. See Fujita, Japanese Regulations, supra note 4, at 343 (noting that in an action brought
pursuant to Article 25 of the AMA, the court must ask the opinion of the FTC in determining the
amount of damages); Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 616 (citing examples of the civil and criminal
sanctions the government may impose for violations of the AMA); see also Young, supra note 63,
at 77 (noting that private enforcement of antitrust violations in Japan rarely, if ever, occurs).
88. The topic of remedies, damages and judicial relief, in general, receives scant attention in
the Code of Civil Procedure, nor is there much positive law. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, DAVID S.
CLARK, JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA
1056 (1994) (citing HALEY & HENDERSON, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 814-16, 897902 (1988)); see Hamabe, supra note 4, at 909 (discussing how the Japanese Supreme Court
denied the private plaintiffs' claim for damages by finding that the plaintiffs "failed to prove the
defendants' price cartel caused the increase in price"); Mackey, supra note 15, at 176-77 (noting
that although "very few remedies are unavailable in Japan in transnational cases," certain damages and injunctions may not be available). Getting a remedy is particularly difficult considering
the standards of discovery and proof in Japanese cases. See Sanekata, supra note 9, at 396 (noting
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tempts to reduce government activity in the area of competition law
to address primarily blatant illegal behavior that effects the society
as a whole. 89 American law recognizes that the vast majority of
cases of anticompetitive behavior relate to matters between private
parties. 90 In keeping with the American view that the government
should keep out of private matters and let the private marketplace
resolve its own disputes, the law attempts to encourage the private
enforcement of antitrust law through the provision of treble damages. 1 While the American treble damage system may give the appearance of having private parties act as "private attorneys general"
serving in a quasi-governmental capacity, throughout the history of
antitrust enforcement Congress, the courts, and commentators have
observed that this is not the primary purpose for the awarding of
treble damages. 92 Rather, it has been clearly stated that the purpose
the systemic disincentives to private litigation); see supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the limited discovery available in Japan and the high standards of proof in private actions).
Japanese law does not provide for class action damage suits. HAHN, supra note 21, at 132-33; see
also Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 631 (noting that the unavailability of class actions renders
victims unable to raise the damage pool high enough to make litigation financially worthwhile).
89. Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 613 (noting that while the government can sue for criminal
sanctions, private damage actions have become the primary deterrent to anticompetitive behavior
in the American system).
90. Nijenhuis, supra note 3, at 1018 (noting that the number of private antitrust suits far
exceeds the number brought by the government).
91. See id. at 1019 ("The treble damages remedy is the centerpiece of the private antitrust
remedy."). Despite U.S. internal disputes as to the value and costs of the private treble damage
action, it is a clear expression of the significance of the private action self-help philosophy in the
U.S. Id. at 1019-22.
92. The purpose and effect of treble damages has been the subject of exhaustive debate since
the legislative discussions during the formation of the Sherman Act in 1890. Extensive debates
have raged over the compensatory versus punitive role of treble damages. The primary nature of
treble damages as compensation is revealed in legislative history and many legal and economic
analyses. For a collection of cases dealing with the measure and elements of damages for antitrust
violations, see John P. Ludington, Measure and Elements of Damages Under 15 U.S.C.S. § 15
Entitling Person Injured in His Business or Property by Reason of Anything Forbidden in Federal Antitrust Laws to Recover Treble Damages - Injury, 16 ALR Fed. 14 (1973). For a glimpse

of the debates and legislative history, see

STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY,

REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

98th Cong., 2d

Sess. (Feb. 1984) at 7-10; see also, Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking Up The Treble Play: Attacks
On The Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17, 56 (1983) (arguing
that treble damages are not punitive); Lawrence Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the AntiTrust Act Penal or Compensatory, 28 KY. L. J. 117, 119 (1939-40) (arguing that in the context of
antitrust litigation, treble damages should be seen as compensatory, not punitive); William J. Nissen, Comment, Antitrust and Arbitration in International Commerce, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 110,
116 (1976) (viewing treble damages as a deterrent that discourages antitrust violations); see also
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, at 635) ("Notwithstanding its
important incidental policing function, the treble-damages cause of action. . . seeks primarily to
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for the treble damage provision is to encourage private parties to act
enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that injury."); For examples of holdings
that treble damages are remedial, not a penalty or forfeiture, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977)
(noting that while treble damages play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring
wrongdoers, treble damages are essentially a remedial measure) cited with approval in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 635-36 (1985); John Lenore & Co., v.
Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1977)); Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal
Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 1942) (noting that since antitrust treble damages
survive the death of a defendant, they are more likely to be viewed as compensatory and less as a
deterrent); Martin Oil Serv., Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 718 F. Supp. 1334, 1361 (N.D. I11.
1989);
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 74-122, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208 at *32-33
(E.D. Pa. DATE 1988) (noting that interest on treble damages was permitted despite the argument that part of the purpose for treble damages was punitive) citing for approval American
Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) (holding that the
primary purpose of treble damages under 15 U.S.C. §15 is to encourage private parties to enforce
the antitrust laws and undertake difficult litigation); Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.,
105 F. Supp. 506, 509 (D. Colo. 1952). However, there have been numerous voices asserting that
the U.S. public policy as reflected in the setting of treble damages is compensatory, deterrent and
punitive. See STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY supra, note 92, at I [N.B.
This report contains an extensive collection of research projects, articles and comments reflecting
the views on this topic by leading scholars, government representatives and practitioners.
The Congressional subcommittee even considered an offer to limit recoveries to actual damages
when trebling would jeopardize plaintiff's rights to collect or retain a judgment under applicable
foreign law. Id. at 44; see, e.g., Report of Consultant, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that throughout its history, "the treble damage suit has been percieved as a vehicle for punishing a violator,
deterring misconduct and compensating the victim"). Although the author declares that in a private system treble damages are an effective force for compensation and he is troubled by the
international implications of treble damages, he fears the abandonment of U.S. consumers and
competitors in a rush to satisfy foreign interests. See also Cira, supra note 2, at 264, 267 (noting
that the availability of treble damages in international antitrust suits makes intergovernmental
resolution more difficult). Others see treble damages as a troubling domestic problem. See Ramseyer, supra note 11, at 605-15 (noting that the American system of treble damages has proven
inappropriate in many cases); see also Clare Deffense, Comment, A Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 72 CA. L.
REv. 437, 456 (1984) (arguing that the availability of treble damages exposes defendants to excessive liability, which "undermines both the efficiency and effectiveness of the private antitrust
enforcement scheme"); Haley, Enforcement, supra note 3, at 318 n.24 (citing to other authorities
who have criticized the availability of treble damages in private antitrust actions). Interestingly,
Haley notes that despite the availability of treble damage actions in the U.S. and the absence of
such damages in Japan, the collected data does not show a greater proportion of damage actions
involving foreign (especially Japanese) defendants in U.S. suits. Id. at 319. There has been some
debate as to whether the wording of the U.S. antitrust statutes allow the awarding of untrebled
damages or whether there must be legislation to permit such a variance. See Sullivan, supra note
92, at 54-55; see also THE STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY, supra, note 92,
at 44 (considering limiting recovery to actual damages when trebling would jeopardize plaintiff's
rights to collect or retain a judgment under applicable foreign laws). But cf.Atlantic Purchasers,
Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, 705 F.2d 712, 720 (4th Cir. 1983) (sitting in a diversity action applying the
North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act of 1969, the court held that where the complaint gave
the defendant no warning that successful prosecution of the claim could result in an award of
treble damages, the treble damage award was properly denied); Inland Steel Prods. Co. v. MPH
Mfg. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 238, 247 (N.D. Il1. 1959) (holding that the "prayer for treble damages has
been waived," and that injunctive relief was the appropriate remedy for the antitrust claim).
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on their own behalf and be sure that they will receive appropriate
compensation for not only that which can be specifically proven, but
with the understanding that it is nearly impossible to establish complete actual damages in an antitrust proceeding and to ensure that
the injured party is made whole.9" If there must be a space for error, wrongdoers should not benefit from their misdeeds.
Therefore, although the parallel competition laws should resolve
any arguments as to the comparability of the substantive coverage
of the laws of both countries, the matter of treble damages will raise
a major public policy issue for Japanese courts. Unfortunately, Japanese writers (and by implication most likely Japanese courts) interpret treble damages as punitive and therefore see these awards as
matters for only government enforcement.94 The inability of the
Japanese courts to understand the distinction between statutorily required treble damages and punitive damages (measured by the intentional nature of the defendant's "bad" acts) can have an extremely negative effect on a U.S. antitrust case brought to Japan for
recognition and enforcement. 95 In Bryant v. Mansei Kogyo Co, 11
93. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564 (1931)
(upholding award of treble damages where exact amount of damages could not be ascertained);
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 & 667 n.36 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that treble
damages serve a compensatory function in antitrust cases because the jury's verdict may not reflect the numerous intangible economic harms resulting from an antitrust violation), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 929 (1975); see also supra note 92 (lending support for the proposition that treble
damages are meant to be compensatory, not punitive in nature).
94. See Nijenhuis, supra note 3, at 1021 (noting that from the foreign perspective, private
individuals should not be permitted to threaten penal sanctions). However, a treble damages provision for Japanese antitrust law was considered in the Kime Draft for the adoption of the 1947
Antimonopoly Law. Iyori, supra note 7, at 66. Indeed, the interpretation of Japanese writers contradicts two practices in Japan. First, Japan does permit double damage recoveries under the
Labor Standards Act (Law No. 49, 1947). Second, private recoveries for emotional distress
["ishariyo"] are permitted. In fact, recovery for ishariyo is an accepted practice in Japan and
would be particularly appropriate for what we call "pain and suffering" or to compensate for
immeasurable damages (such as is used in treble damage actions) in addition to actual provable
damages. See Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 79, at 451-53. Although the amount recovered
would be substantially smaller than treble damages, the method for this type of recovery through
ishariyo already exists and is common in Japan. See infra notes 101-03 (detailing an interview
with Professor Nomura).
95. A prominent American legal scholar on Japan has observed "Japanese and European resistance can be anticipated to any attempts to equalize such costs [U.S. costs of private antitrust
enforcement] by seeking to impose similar burdens through reforms designed to introduce American-styled enforcement measures, such as treble damage actions." Haley, Enforcement, supra
note 3, at 323-24. However, placing economic burdens on Japanese society is not the reason to
obtain enforcement of U.S. cases awarding treble damage antitrust decisions. There is a quite
valid desire to obtain appropriate compensation as has been perceived by the U.S. courts and law.
See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 720 F. Supp. 894, 902-04 (D. Utah 1989)
(distinguishing the Economic Stabilization Act's ("ESA") punitive nature as against antitrust
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the only case where there has been an attempt to obtain recognition
and enforcement in Japan of an American award of punitive damages,97 the Tokyo District Court, after a discussion of the public
policy against the recovery of punitive damages in Japan, accepted
the possibility of recognition and enforcement of a U.S. punitive
damage award, but found the facts insufficient in this case to order
the recovery of punitive damages.9 8 However, on appeal to the Tokyo High Court, the Court opined that the district court was wrong
and that Article 200 (3) prevented the recognition of private punitive damages as violative of public policy in the Japanese legal system because the concept of punitive damages implies criminal behavior and punishment for criminal behavior that is reserved solely
to public law. 9
Although scholars in Japan have debated these decisions quite actively, significantly their commentaries fail to address the dichotomy
between punitive damages and the broad compensatory damage theories that relate to treble damage practices in American antitrust
law. 100 Therefore, in addition to the presentation of jurisdictional
sufficiency, it is essential for the foreign plaintiff to provide the findings of fact by the trier of fact that establish the determination of
damages, as well as the final damage decree and award. Following
treble damages). The court noted these criteria: (1) under ESA treble damages are awarded only
if the act was intentional unlike an antitrust compulsory award regardless of mental state of the
defendant; and, (2) the ESA grants the court discretion as to the amount of the damages, "presumably being better able to match the 'punishment' with the evilness of the violation" and, (3)
"the antitrust damages are required to fully compensate the antitrust plaintiff because proving
actual damages resulting from price-fixing is extremely difficult." Id. at 903 (citing Martin Oil
Service, Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 718 F. Supp. 1334, 1361-63 (N.D. Ill. 1989)); STUDY OF THE
ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY, supra note 92, at 2; see supra note 92 (reviewing the arguments asserted about whether to characterize treble damages as punitive or compensatory). In the
U.S., treble damage actions have been likened to: "tort for trespass on the case", Wolf Sales Co.,
105 F. Supp. at 508; property rights, Barnes Coal Corp., 128 F.2d at 649; and early forms of
trade law in common law England. Id.
96. Santa Clara Super. Ct. [Dkt. No.] [hereafter referred to by the name for the plaintiff used
in the Japanese case "Northcon"] (a non-antitrust business and contract law case); see also An
Oregon Partnership, Northcon I v. Yoshitaka Katayama; Mansei Kogyo K.K., Judicial Decisions

(Private International Law), 35

THE

JAPANESE

ANNUAL

OF INT'L LAW,

177 [hereafter

"Northcon"].
97. See Mackey, supra note 16, at 174 (noting that besides Bryant, "there are no other Japanese cases that are on record on the issue of punitive or treble damages"); see also, Northcon,
supra note 96, at 181-83.
98. Id.
99. Translation of the Tokyo High Court decision.
100. See Translations of articles by Professors Dougauchi, Watanabe, Kono, Ebisawa and interviews with Professors Watanabe and Nakano.
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this, it would be incumbent upon a U.S. plaintiff to make one of
three arguments in a claim for recognition and enforcement in Japan of damages awarded by an American court in an antitrust case:
1 - the plaintiff will accept an award of specific actual proven
damages as set forth in the U.S. decree (whether or not the original
complaint and award included a treble damage provision); 2 - the
plaintiff was awarded treble damages as compensation (not as punishment of the defendant) and the case for this distinction can be
supported through a substantial brief to the Japanese courts explaining how this comports with Japanese law; or, 3 - the plaintiff
resubstantiates the damages. Although this last method seems to violate the standard that comity expects recognition without looking
behind the decision of the deciding foreign court, 101 arguments have
been espoused in Japan that there is a division between the recognition of the decision in the foreign case and the awarding of damages.10 2 The implication of this process is that the respect for the
legal doctrines of the foreign sovereign are maintained yet the appropriate compensation must be measured as is appropriate within
each society. 103 Finally, in keeping with Japanese law, a successful
plaintiff should be able to recover court costs and possibly reasonable attorneys fees. Of course, the plaintiff must be prepared to provide substantiation for these expenses. Interest may also be
recoverable.
CONCLUSION

Japanese and American courts and governments are searching for
ways to resolve the disparity between the two countries as to the role
and application of competition law in their societies. The recent
United States Supreme Court approval of extraterritorial jurisdiction in U.S. antitrust cases has heightened the need for resolution of
this conflict with a special focus on comity. Whatever the Japanese
government's intentions by its recent expansion of its competition
laws for both public and private use, the JFTC concession of its
inability to expand significantly its antitrust enforcement makes the
benefits of these laws largely illusory. Furthermore, although the
101. This concept is accepted
"a Japanese court is not allowed
of the underlying transaction of
102. Interview with Professor
103. Id.

in Japan. See Fujita, Service, supra note 18, at 71 (stating that
to look behind the face of the decree and inquire into the nature
the original claim").
Watanabe.
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Toshiba Elevator case indicates the long-range potential for private
enforcement of competition law in Japan, and may have opened a
path for comity through the recognition and enforcement of foreign
competition law cases, that path is still littered with barriers due to
the diversity of the Japanese and American legal and governmental
systems. Therefore, the potential for recognition and enforcement in
Japan of the antitrust decisions of the American courts requires that
plaintiffs elect to proceed in a very deliberate fashion recognizing
the differences in the systems and guiding their cases so that they
will fit the structure and values of the Japanese system. It is not
unreasonable for the Japanese government and its courts to expect
that its law and procedures will be followed. However, recognition
and enforcement does not require equality or parallel laws. Instead,
a good faith effort by the U.S. courts to meet the requirements of
Japanese law should not be denied under arbitrary and broad readings of public policy under Japanese law. Hopefully, the recognition
and enforcement of U.S. antitrust decisions obtained through traditional procedural means will bring greater harmony and respect between our two systems and avoid the distrust and acrimony that
currently prevails.

